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The Courts decided 57 cases1 in 1994 under the New York State
Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA).2 As in prior years,3
this column presents a statistical summary of these cases and
analyzes emerging trends. The 57 cases last year are about the
same number as in 1993, but are down from the 70-75 seen
annually in the early 1990s.
When the 1994 cases are viewed as a whole, two things are
particularly striking. First, developers and property owners are
increasingly using SEQRA; nine of last year's cases were from this
category of parties, rather than the more usual environmentalist
plaintiffs. Second, the courts are, more and more, dismissing
SEQRA cases because they find the plaintiffs lack standing to sue.
Ten cases were decided on this ground in 1994.
SEQRA requires the preparation of an environmental impact
statement (EIS) when a state or local agency considers a
discretionary action that may have a significant effect on the
environment. Despite the volume of litigation, only a small
fraction of actions subject to SEQRA lead to judicial decisions. The
details of the SEQRA process are spelled out in regulations of DEC.4
In 1994, there were 232 positive declarations (formal notices that
an EIS would be prepared), and the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC) received notices of 1,107
negative declarations (although this is only a small subset of the
negative declarations that were issued).
In 1993 and 1994, DEC went through a lengthy series of public
hearings and consultations aimed at a comprehensive revision to
these regulations. The agency was on the verge of promulgating
the new rules when Governor Cuomo was defeated in the November
1994 election. The rules were put on hold, and the Pataki
administration has not announced what it plans to do with them.
Statistical Results
As has consistently been the case since these annual reviews
began, challenges to EISs were much less successful in 1994 than
were challenges to negative declarations (i.e., formal

determinations that no EIS is necessary).
There were decisions in 12 challenges to completed EISs (or
substantive actions based on completed EISs) in 1994. All the
challenges were dismissed but one. The one exception was a cluster
of related cases concerning an effort to build a large Home Depot
store in the Village of Port Chester in Westchester County. Justice
James R. Cowhey, who decided all these cases, took the unusual
step of finding that the Village's Board of Trustees had not been
actively involved in reviewing Home Depot's permit applications,
but rather had simply adopted the documents submitted by Home
Depot's consultants without independent review. Thus, he
concluded, "the Board abdicated its responsibility" under SEQRA.5
Challenges to negative declarations, or the failure to prepare an
EIS without such a declaration, did much better in 1994.
The defendants' victories often stemmed from procedural defects in
their opponents' claims. In all, 10 lawsuits were dismissed because
the plaintiffs were found to lack standing to sue; six were
dismissed because the suits were brought after expiration of the
statute of limitations; three were dismissed as not yet ripe; in two,
the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies;
and one claim was moot.
One of the challenges dismissed for lack of standing arose in the
only Court of Appeals decision of 1994 that dealt with SEQRA. In
East Thirteenth Street Community Assn. v. New York State Urban
Development Corp.,6 neighbors sued UDC for condemning property
for the construction of a 14-story building to house homeless and
low-income families. They brought an original proceeding under
the Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL), claiming that UDC
had violated the EDPL in the way it carried out the condemnation
and that UDC had violated SEQRA by issuing a negative
declaration.
The Court of Appeals found that the petitioners were not
condemnees, were not otherwise entitled to standing under the
EDPL and could not "bootstrap" themselves into standing in their
EDPL claim based on the fact that they would have had standing
under SEQRA. Thus the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of
the case.
East Thirteenth Street was an entirely procedural case (although it
did typify the courts' general sympathy to the construction of
facilities for homeless people). Other standing cases from lower
courts were not uniformly procedural; several of them embodied
the view of the judges that the challenged actions would not really
harm the environment and that the plaintiffs were therefore not
actually aggrieved.7
Another procedural trend is the tendency of some courts,

especially the Appellate Division, Third Department, to depart
from the traditional "strict procedural compliance" standard
under SEQRA8 and to excuse minor procedural errors.9
Suits by Owners
As noted above, a significant portion of the 1994 suits were
brought, not by environmentalists, but by businesses or property
owners seeking judicial help in moving their projects forward.
Two of these lawsuits were successful. In Leisure Time Billiards v.
Rose,10 a town denied various approvals for a billiard parlor on
the grounds that the facility would have an undesirable effect on
the surrounding community and that it would create excessive
traffic. The court noted that the project's SEQRA statements had
found the billiard parlor would not have an adverse effect on the
environment, and therefore the town was effectively precluded
from disapproving the project on environmental grounds. This
decision is reminiscent of a 1992 Court of Appeals decision that
found that a town cannot deny approval for a project (in that case, a
radio transmission tower) for impacts that the SEQRA documents
said the project would not have.11
The other successful lawsuit of this sort was Gordon v. Matthew,12
which arises from a controversy in Suffolk County over the
construction of steel bulkheads on beachfront property. DEC had
become the lead agency under SEQRA for a series of applications
for such bulkheads and issued negative declarations. Another
governmental body, the Coastal Erosion Hazard Board of Review,
was unhappy with these decisions and issued positive
declarations.
However, the court ruled, this was contrary to the design of SEQRA,
under which an agency, once designated as lead agency, had final
say (subject to judicial review) over whether an EIS would be
required. The court overturned the Hazard Board's positive
declarations and ordered the board "to act with due expediency" on
the applications.
Several other lawsuits by businesses were unsuccessful. These
included cases challenging governmental agencies' requests for
environmental information,13 a utility's plea that a county
should have to prepare an EIS before requiring that new utility
poles be set back from the road14 and a federal suit against town
officials who had refused to grant a developer approval for as large
a project as he requested after preparing an EIS.15 One developer
unsuccessfully sought money damages for delays in the
processing of its applications under SEQRA,16 and another was
sanctioned for bringing what the court found to be a frivolous
lawsuit against an environmental group that was challenging its
project.17

Scope of Analysis
Three appellate cases from 1994 shed important light on the scope
of judicial review and environmental analysis.
In Coalition Against Lincoln West v. City of New York,18 the City
Council took zoning actions to approve Donald Trump's Riverside
South development project. Opponents have argued that the project
would create so much sewage that the capacity of the North River
Water Pollution Control Plant would be exceeded.
The court dismissed the petition, but stated:
we note with concern the City's projections, supported by data
concerning the purported net increase in wastewater flow from the
catchment area into the designated North River facility, and the
claim in the FEIS that the project would not cause the capacity
limits set forth in the [water pollution] permit to be exceeded,
notwithstanding a history of chronic permit violations and a
present failure to comply with an outstanding consent order with
[DEC].
The court went on to say that, upon reviewing the record, "we find
no indication that the data is spurious or that the projects are
facially invalid, and accordingly defer to the expertise of the
administrative agencies."
This outcome follows the dictate of the Court of Appeals19 that
courts afford considerable deference to expert agencies and not
second-guess their technical judgments. Thus the First
Department, at least, has declared that, notwithstanding judges'
skepticism about the contents of an EIS, courts should not step in
unless the data are "spurious" or "facially invalid."
The scope of lead agency review, rather than of judicial review, was
the subject of Schulz v. DEC,20 a suit brought by New York's
best-known and most successful pro se environmental litigant,
Robert Schulz. DEC had promulgated wastewater regulations for
Lake George. Schulz argued, and the Appellate Division agreed,
that an inevitable consequence of these regulations will be the
construction of a sewer system for portions of the Lake George area
and that this construction may have significant environmental
impacts. Thus DEC's negative declaration for the regulations was
annulled, because DEC's environmental review of the regulations
had been too narrow.
Another lead agency was found to have been too narrow in its
environmental analysis in Farrington Close Condominium v.
Incorporated Village of Southampton.21 The Village sought to
develop a park on a 17-acre parcel adjacent to various
condominiums. The Village looked at the immediate plans for the
park, which included a parking lot, access roads and a baseball
field and issued a negative declaration. In doing so, the Village
acted in a very cursory fashion without any close analysis, the

court found. Just as important, in the court's view, the Village did
not examine the long-term development plans for the park, which
included a football/soccer field, softball field, fitness trail,
playground, tennis courts and an administration building. Thus
the negative declaration was annulled because the Village had
improperly segmented its review.
A final decision worthy of note was Miller v. City of Lockport.22 The
City issued a negative declaration for a solid waste transfer station
and material recovery facility. The Environmental Assessment
Form had found numerous adverse impacts, but the City found
that these impacts would be mitigated. SEQRA provides for a
special procedure in such cases where impacts are found but will
be mitigated as a condition of approval.
This procedure, the "conditional negative declaration," involves
more public notice and deliberation than a standard negative
declaration. The City had not gone through these procedures,
which in any event are not available for Type 1 actions, and the
negative declaration was annulled. Moreover, the Appellate
Division noted that there is a low threshold of environmental
impact for preparing EISs, and the proposed facility had seemed to
cross that threshold.

NOTES
(1)All of these cases will be discussed in the forthcoming fifth
annual update to Environmental Impact Review in New York by
Michael B. Gerrard, Daniel A. Ruzow and Philip Weinberg
(Matthew Bender).
(2) N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law Art. 8.
(3)Prior reviews appeared in The New York Law Journal on
March 29, 1991; March 27, 1992; March 26, 1993 and April 22, 1994.
(4) 6 NYCRR Part 617.
(5)City of Rye v. Branco, Index No. 93-13257, slip op. at 35 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester Co. April 19, 1994). Related cases decided the same day
in the same court were Preston v. Board of Trustees for the Village of
Port Chester, Index No. 93-19947;Preston v. Planning Commission
for the Village of Port Chester, Index No. 16328-93; Preston v.
Planning Commission for the Village of Port Chester, Index No.
93-13040.
(6) 84 NY2d 287, 641 NE2d 1368, 617 NYS2d 706 (1994).
(7)E.g., Stephens v. Gordon, 202 AD2d 437, 610 NYS2d 531 (2d Dept.
1994).
(8)E.g., Rye Town/King Civic Assn. v. Town of Rye, 82 AD2d 474, 442
NYS2d 67 (2d Dept. 1981), app. dismissed, 56 NY2d 985, 439 NE2d
401, 453 NYS2d 682 (1982).
(9)Hingston v. New York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation,
202 AD2d 877, 609 NYS2d 446 (3d Dept.) app. denied, 84 NY2d 809,
645 NE2d 1218, 621 NYS2d 518 (1994);Steele v. Town of Salem
Planning Board, 200 AD2d 870, 606 NYS2d 810 (3d Dept.), app.

denied, 83 NY2d 757, 639 NE2d 415, 615 NYS2d 874 (1994).
(10)201 AD2d 340, 607 NYS2d 312 (1st Dept. 1994).
(11)WEOK Broadcasting Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Lloyd, 79 NY2d 373,
592 NE2d 778, 583 NYS2d 170 (1992).
(12)NYLJ, Sept. 12, 1994, 33:4 (Sup.Ct. Suffolk Co.).
(13)Carlson Associates v. Town Board of Smithtown, 206 AD2d 530,
615 NYS2d 407 (2d Dept. 1994); Bay View Pines Estates Inc. v.
Wines, 204 AD2d 316, 611 NYS2d 576 (2d Dept. 1994).
(14)New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Commissioner of Dutchess
County Dept. of Public Works, 205 AD2d 1033, 613 NYS2d 784 (3d
Dept.), app. denied, 84 NY2d 809, 645 NE2d 1218, 621 NYS2d 518
(1994).
(15)Orange Lake Associates Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F3d 1214 (2d. Cir.
1994).
(16)Omabuild USA No. 1 Inc. v. State of New York AD2d , 615
NYS2d 424 (2d Dept. 1994).
(17)Gordon v. Marrone, 202 AD2d 104, 616 NYS2d 98 (2d Dept.
1994).
(18) AD2d , 617 NYS2d 744 (1st Dept. 1994).
(19)See Akpan v. Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 554 NE2d 53, 555 NYS2d
(1990).
(20)200 AD2d 793, 606 NYS2d 459 (3d Dept.), app. dismissed, 83
NY2d 848, 634 NE2d 607, 612 NYS2d 111, app. denied, 83NY2d
758, 639 NE2d 416, 615 NYS2d 875 (1994).
(21) 205 AD2d 623, 613 NYS2d 257 (2d Dept. 1994).
(22)
AD2d , 620 NYS2d 680 (4th Dept. 1994).
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